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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this divorce appeal pursuant to 
UtahG xle A,i JI: i , § 78 2a 3(2)(1 i) - [1992) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May Appellant Jerry Springer challenge the trial court's award of 
alimony and attorney fees when he fails lo marshal all ot tin* evidence at Inal thai 
sup|a»4>rts the .-iward? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court will review the trial court's factual 
findings only when the Appellant In. marshalled all mil lln- r\ ulciu i in ^uppnrl ul 
those findings and demonstrated that, despite such evidence, the findings are against 
the clear weight of evidence and, therefore, an abuse of discretion. In the absence of 
that marshalling, the appellate court u ill not attempt to review 11 
assume their correctness. Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991); 
Fife v. Fife. 777 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Was the award of $300.00 per month permanent alimony to Appellee 
Mrs. Springer an abuse of discretion after a 29-year marriage when there is substantial 
evidence of Mrs. Springer's financial circumstances and need, and of the Appellant's 
ability to pay alimony? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court will not disturb the award of alimony 
when the trial court has exercised its discretion within the bounds and under the 
standards set by the appellate courts. Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 
App. 1988). The standard for alimony focuses upon the financial needs of the wife, 
her ability to provide income, and the husband's ability to provide support. Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). This court will defer to the trial court's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given the evidence. If 
the trial court considers the Jones factors, this court will not disturb the alimony 
award unless "a serious inequity" is shown, amounting to a "clear abuse of 
discretion." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, 533-4 (Utah App. 1990) (on 
rehearing). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Mrs. Springer a 
reasonable attorney fee of $2,064.00. Also, should Mrs. Springer be awarded her 
attorney fees incurred on appeal? 
2 
Standard of Review: An award of attorney fees in divorce is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court when the court finds, based upon the evidence, the party's 
need for assistance, the Appellant's ability to assist, and the reasonableness of the fee. 
Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 
493 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There is no statutory authority in Utah which is determinative of the issues 
presented on appeal. However, the Utah Uniform Child Support statute on 
determining gross income, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992) is included herein as 
Addendum "I" for the court's convenience. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant and defendant Jerry Springer appeals the decree of divorce entered 
May 21, 1992 and challenges the award to plaintiff Mrs. Springer of $300.00 per 
month alimony and $2,064.00 in attorney fees. A copy of the Decree of Divorce (R. 
76) and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 70) are Addenda "A" and 
"BM, respectively. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Appellee Karen Springer filed her divorce complaint on April 5, 1991. Mrs. 
Springer sought custody of three teenage children, an equitable division of the assets 
and liabilities, child support, alimony, and attorney fees. (R. 1-4) 
Appellant Jerry Springer filed his answer, admitting virtually all the allegations 
of the plaintiffs complaint, except the grounds for divorce. (R. 13, 12) Appellant 
specifically admitted that his income as a state employee was approximately $3,000.00 
per month and that Mrs. Springer's income as a school teacher was $1,700.00 per 
month. (R. 12) 
Prior to trial, the parties settled several issues, including placing the home for 
sale and dividing its proceeds equally, child custody, life and health insurance, and the 
division of personal property and retirement assets. (R. 24, 23; Tr. 4-8) 
The only issues left for trial were the amounts of alimony, attorney fees, and 
child support to be awarded to Mrs. Springer. (Tr. 9) After a one-day trial on 
January 30, 1992, the trial judge issued his memorandum decision on March 16, 1992 
(R. 54), attached as Addendum "C\ 
A decree and formal findings were prepared by Appellant's counsel. The court 
entered those findings and final decree on May 21, 1992. Generally, the court 
ordered, inter alia, that: 
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1. Mrs. Springer was awarded custody of the three teenage children and 
monthly child support of $657.00, based upon the uniform child support guidelines; 
(R. 75, 72 - Add. A) 
2. The real and personal property were equally divided by agreement; (R. 
73 - Add. A) 
3. Retirement accounts were equally divided; (R. 73 - Add. A) 
4. Based upon Appellant's regular income of $36,240.00 and Mrs. 
Springer's regular income of $21,335.00, and their respective expenses, as adjusted, 
Mrs. Springer was awarded $300.00 monthly alimony; (R. 62, 63, 64 - Add. B) 
5. Based upon a finding of reasonableness, Mrs. Springer's need, and 
Appellant's ability to assist her need, Mrs. Springer was awarded $2,064.00, 
representing one-half (Vi) of her attorney fees. (R. 72 - Add. A) 
Mr. Springer's notice of appeal was filed June 4, 1992. (R. 82) He also gave 
notice that a trial transcript had been prepared. (R. 86) A transcript has never been 
filed of record and does not appear on the clerk's index filed in this court. 
Notwithstanding, because Appellant refers to the transcript in his brief, Appellee will 
cite herein to the evidence and testimony in the transcript as though it was part of the 
record on appeal. 
During this appeal, Mrs. Springer garnished Appellant's bank account to obtain 
payment of the attorney fee judgment. (R. 93, 95) The garnishee Zions First 
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National Bank paid the garnishment without any objection from Appellant. (R. 95) A 
satisfaction of judgment for $2,064.00 attorney fee award only was filed on 
September 9, 1992. (R. 97) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee Karen Springer objects to Appellant's fleeting "Statement of Facts" 
because said statement is incomplete and Appellant fails to marshal the facts that 
support the alimony and attorney fee awards. Although Appellant purports to marshal 
the facts in his argument, he inserts unsupported conclusions and relies only upon 
evidence to support those conclusions. Appellant omits evidence supporting the 
Decree in an attempt to reargue his version of the facts. Because Appellant fails to 
state all the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the Decree, Appellee 
provides the following Statement of Facts: 
Appellee Karen Springer and Appellant Jerry Springer were married almost 30 
years ago in March, 1963. (Tr. 12) Mrs. Springer is 49 years old; Appellant is 55 
years old. (Tr. 10, 61) At the time of the divorce, the parties resided at their home 
in Midway, Wasatch County, Utah. (Tr. 10) 
Mrs. Springer obtained her Bachelor of Science degree in 1964-5 with a 
teaching certificate. (Tr. 48) However, for a majority of the marriage, she raised the 
parties' six children. (Tr. 145) At trial, three of the six children were still in their 
teenage years, 12 through 16. (Tr. 12-3) 
Appellant is employed as a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the State 
Office of Education in Provo. Appellant holds a Master's degree in sociology and 
was "very close" to his doctorate, requiring only his dissertation. (Tr. 61-4) 
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As a rehabilitation counselor for over twenty years, Appellant earns a gross 
monthly income of $3,020.00 ($36,240.00 a year), with a $2,016 monthly take home, 
after insurance and taxes. (Tr. 61; Exh. 5) Supplementing this income, he also 
lectures for Brigham Young University, receiving $25.00 per hour plus expenses, and 
for the National Park Service. (Tr. 63-4, 151-4) In 1991, he received an additional 
$400.00 for his lectures, as well as "paid vacations" at the national parks. (Tr. 64-5, 
154-5) 
Prior to the trial, Appellant also taught night classes at V/asatch High School. 
He claimed he was only paid $1,349.00 for this teaching, even though he reported 
income of $2,600.00 on his 1990 tax return and $2,490.00 in 1989. (Tr. 68; Exhs. 
19, 20) At trial, he asserted that he had stopped teaching there because the district 
declined to rehire him for the 1991-92 school year. (Tr. 62) 
After 1987, Mrs. Springer returned to teaching and now teaches sixth grade at 
the Wasatch Middle School in Heber City. (Tr. 10, 13, 46) As a "step 5" teacher 
with a B.S. degree and 30 extra hours, Mrs. Springer is paid $21,335.00 per year, or 
$1,778.00 per month gross income. (Tr. 14; Exh. 13) 
Mrs. Springer also described to the trial court all of the other sources of 
payments to her, however uncertain, in her teaching position. (Exh. 13; Tr. 14-7, 34-
7, 45-7, 49) In addition to her base salary, Mrs. Springer is also eligible for and 
receives a "career ladder" incentive ($825.00 in 1991-92, paid to her at $69.00 per 
8 
month). (Exh. 13; Tr. 30-4) Including this "career ladder" money, if she participates 
in that program, she "nets" a monthly take-home pay of $1,351.00 (Tr. 15-6; Exh. 
13) 
If Mrs. Springer successfully completes all additional career ladder 
requirements for a school year, she is then eligible to receive an additional one-time 
career ladder "bonus" in May. (Tr. 15, 9) In May 1991, she qualified for a lump 
sum "bonus" of $772.00 which was less than her 1990 "bonus". (Tr. 46; Exh. 13, 9) 
While Mrs. Springer assumed that an additional $700.00 to $1,100.00 might be 
possible in May 1992, the district superintendent cautioned that the Wasatch School 
District had reduced its performance bonus money that year. Whatever "bonus" 
money was available would depend upon the number of candidates who completed the 
necessary program requirements. (Exh. 9; Tr. 17) Mrs. Springer was told that 
career ladder money was "down" and could even be as little as one-half (Vi) of prior 
years. (Tr. 47) The superintendent's letter explaining the career ladder funding is 
Exhibits 9 and 23 and is attached as Addendum "H". 
The availability of "career-ladder money" varies from year to year. (Tr. 15, 
46-7) Mrs. Springer explained that an amount of career ladder "bonus" cannot be 
known in advance because it is dependent upon a complicated mathematical formula 
with numerous variables. First, the career ladder income is dependent upon legislative 
funding, which is allocated between the various school districts. Wasatch School 
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District's allocation is based upon the number of applicants and those who ultimately 
qualify at various levels. Each applicant, such as Mrs. Springer, must meet 
individual, personal criteria during the year. Then, upon qualification at the end of 
the year, the amount of individual "bonus" received depends up)on the number of 
qualifying participants, statewide and within the district. Less experienced teachers, 
such as Mrs. Springer, receive less. (Tr. 45-7; Exh. 9, Add. H) 
The trial court specifically found that, for child support and alimony purposes, 
Mrs. Springer's career ladder funds should not be included in her income because the 
career ladder program could lead to "higher salary" for Mrs. Springer in the future, 
potentially reducing future alimony. (Memo. Dec. R. 53, 52) Furthermore, 
dependence upon speculative career ladder income would bring Mrs. Springer 
uncertainty on a year-to-year basis and penalize her for seeking extra compensation 
while pursuing career advancement. (Memo. Dec, R. 53; Findings, R. 65) 
As a recreation-type "hobby", and in support of her 16-year-old daughter's 
activities, Mrs. Springer also attends tumbling competitions. Occasionally, she has 
judged at these competitions. (Tr. 49-51) Although she was paid $405.00 for her 
judging in 1991, her expenses for uniforms and travel to and from the competitions 
exceeded $500.00. (Tr. 50-1; Exh. 22, Sched. C) The trial court excluded Mrs. 
Springer's "tumbling" money, as well as Appellant's lecturing income, in calculating 
child support and alimony. 
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In fixing child support under the statutory guideline, the court applied 
Appellant's income of $3,020.00 and Mrs. Springer's base salary of $1,778.00 to 
calculate a child support payment of $218.00 per teenager. (Child Support 
Worksheet, R. 56 - attached as Addendum "D"). 
The trial court also pared down each party's allowed reasonable living 
expenses. Mrs. Springer itemized the monthly living expenses for herself and her 
three daughters, totaling $2,579.89. (Exh. 17, attached as Addendum ,fF") Her listed 
expenses are based upon the monthly average of her actual expenses over the eight to 
nine months prior to the trial. (Tr. 27, 52-5) During the divorce proceedings, her 
expenses exceeded her income (including temporary support). She had to exhaust her 
savings and borrow from her parents. (Tr. 42) 
She also testified that the agreed sale of the family home meant that she and her 
daughters would live somewhere else "not as nice11 and would reduce her house 
payment. (Tr. 29) The court reduced her "necessary" house payment $241.00. 
(Memo. Dec, R. 51; Exh. 17) The court declined to allow her tithing contributions 
of $230.00 and $150.00 to replace her 1988 sedan; reduced the monthly food expense 
by $75.00; and reduced her expenses for her daughters' school activities, school 
lunches, entertainment and clothing by $124.00. (Tr. 51-5; R. 51) The trial court 
allowed her $1,800.00 as reasonable expenses — a reduction of $780.00. 
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In addition to these regular monthly expenses, Mrs. Springer also itemized 
other marital debts that she owed, (Exh. 16 attached as Addendum "G"), including an 
R.C. Willey bill for Christmas ($395.00), the loan on her automobile ($1,912.00 
repaid at $150.00 per month), family dental bills ($715.00), her bank overdraft 
($225.00), her then billed attorney fees ($3,555.00), and her loan from her parents 
($500.00). (Tr. 21-4; Exh. 16, Add. G) The court found that even with economies 
and reductions in some areas, Mrs. Springer still had need for assistance in meeting 
her monthly expenses. (Add. C, R. 51) 
Appellant Mr. Springer claimed monthly expenses for himself alone of 
$2,312.00. (Exh. 5 p. 4; R. 50) Living in his mother's home in Pleasant Grove, 
Appellant claimed that he was paying $552.00 a month in rent, utilities, maintenance, 
and insurance. (Tr. 79, 109; Exh. 5, p. 4) He estimated $98.00 a month of 
entertainment expenses, compared to $75.00 a month expended by Mrs. Springer and 
three teenagers. (Exh. 5, p. 5; Exh 13) His church tithing contributions were 
grouped with his "incidentals" of $150.00 a month. (Tr. I l l ) Appellant also claimed 
a $240.00 monthly payments for two vehicles (Tr. 115, Exh. 5, p. 5). 
The trial court found that Appellant's expense items were overstated, giving 
some specific examples. After eliminating Appellant's tithing contributions and 
incidentals of $150.00, the trial court found that Appellant's expenses "such as 
entertainment, incidentals and auto payments, which both parties have, . . [were] 
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high" and should be reduced to meet reasonable needs. (Memo. Dec, R. 50-1) The 
court did not, however, state what it considered to be a reasonable total for all of 
Appellant's monthly expenses. (R. 50) 
In order to equalize Mrs. Springer's burden to maintain a home for herself and 
the three teenagers and a lifestyle "somewhere near" that of the marriage, with both 
parties' incomes and expenses, the court awarded Mrs. Springer $300.00 monthly 
alimony. (R. 50) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Mr. Springer has not marshalled the evidence that supports the 
alimony and attorney fee awards. Substantial evidence in the record shows Mrs. 
Springer's financial need; the extent that she, herself, contributed to meet that need; 
and Appellant's ability to pay alimony. The evidence supports the trial court's 
findings on each of these Jones factors. 
Although Appellant may argue his own interpretation of the evidence or opinion 
as to what he thinks fair, the responsibility to determine the equities lies with the trial 
court — not with Appellant. Because the Jones factors were properly considered and 
findings were made on each, the alimony award is not seriously inequitable. 
Event if the trial court confused the various sources of Mrs. Springer's income 
in its Memorandum Decision, the evidence is clear and unrefuted that the amount of 
career ladder money is uncertain from year-to-year and was properly excluded from 
alimony calculations. And, the evidence supports a finding of her need and his ability 
to pay, even if the higher income levels are assessed to her as Appellant argues. 
Finally, Appellant admits that the child support award is proper. That award is 
based upon the same gross income of both parties which the trial court used to 
determine alimony. If Mrs. Springer's income was proper to calculate child support, 
it was also proper to determine alimony. 
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As to the attorney fee award, the court received and considered, without any 
objection, evidence of Mrs. Springer's need and the reasonableness of her attorney's 
fee. After considering this evidence and the evidence of both parties' financial 
circumstance the trial court made adequate findings on her need, his ability to assist 
with her need, and the reasonableness of the fee. There is no basis to disturb the 
award to Mrs. Springer of one-half of her attorney fees at trial. She should also be 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PERMANENT 
ALIMONY OF $300.00 PER MONTH TO MRS. SPRINGER. 
The trial court's award of $300.00 a month in alimony is warranted by the 
substantial evidence at trial of Mrs. Springer's need, her inability to meet that need as 
a sixth grade teacher, and Appellant's ability to assist in meeting the need. Alimony's 
primary function is to enable Mrs. Springer to maintain, as nearly as possible, the 
"standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 
76 (Utah App. 1991). The well-established standard for determining alimony in Utah 
considers: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the wife, and 
2. The ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and 
3. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
When these factors have been considered, this court will not disturb the trial 
court's considerable discretion unless Appellant shows that such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Rudman, 812 P.2d at 76. In this 
case, Appellant fails to show such a "serious inequity" or abuse, and the record does 
not reasonably support any such contention. 
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Appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the alimony award to show 
that the award was inequitable. Viewed with the decree as a whole, Appellant's 
burden is not met when his facts and argument are incomplete and inaccurate. Neither 
this court nor Appellee should undertake to complete Appellant's duty for him. 
Without an accurate and adequate marshaling, this court should refuse to even 
consider the substance of Appellant's dispute of the trial court's findings. Potter v. 
Potter, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 38, n. 1 (Ct. App. 1992); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 
974, 979 (Utah 1992); Accord Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1184 (Utah App. 1987) (In the absence of a concise, accurate statement of the facts, 
marshaling the evidence, this court assumes the correctness of the findings and 
judgment.) 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it excluded Mrs. Springer's 
career ladder income from alimony calculations. The determination of Mrs. 
Springer's income to assess alimony under Jones is not clearly erroneous. Nor is the 
alimony awarded clearly erroneous when considering the entire record. Even 
assuming that Mrs. Springer's dependable income was as much as Appellant claims, 
the alimony award is still not an abuse of discretion or inequitable. 
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A. The exclusion of Mrs. Springer's speculative career ladder income to determine 
spousal support is not clearly erroneous. 
Appellant's brief correctly identifies the four sources of income to Mrs. 
Springer at the time of trial: 
L Her base salary - $21,335 in 1991 as a teacher step 5, paid monthly. 
2. A career ladder incentive - $825 per year in 1991, paid monthly. Career 
ladder income changes from year to year depending on appropriated funds and the 
district career ladder plan. (Exh. 9, Add. H) 
3. A career ladder bonus - paid in May 1992. In addition to funding, the 
amount of this bonus will depend upon the level of participation, completion of 
program requirements, and number of participants statewide and in the district. Mrs. 
Springer received $772.00 in 1991. However, the bonus paid has been less in the 
three years she has participated in the program and was predicted to be less again in 
1992. (Tr. 46-7) 
The trial court found that inclusion of income from the career ladder program 
for support purposes "would bring uncertainty on a year-to-year basis, as well as 
penalize her for seeking extra compensation while pursuing career advancement." The 
Career Ladder Program could lead to a higher salary and, thereby, to less alimony in 
the future. (Memo. Dec, R. 53, 52; Findings, 65, 64) 
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4, Tumbling judge - at daughter's tumbling meets where her expenses to 
support her daughter in this activity exceed the total earned. 
However, beyond properly identifying these sources, Appellant's brief then 
hops around the several variations of monthly, yearly income evidence and expenses, 
picking and choosing different figures depending on which suits his position. What is 
his position? It is that after a 28-year marriage, during which his 50-year-old partner 
worked in the home, and now with an income 30 percent higher than all of her 
income, Appellant does not have to pay any alimony. (Tr. 160) Appellant has to 
compare apples to oranges to support that position. 
Appellant's narrow point of view in this case is very much like the husband in 
Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1978). In Carter, the parties divorced 
after a 31-year marriage, owning modest assets. The wife was unemployed during the 
marriage, but, upon divorce, secured a teaching position. The husband complained 
when the trial court refused to terminate her $350.00 per month alimony, arguing that 
her teaching income was sufficient for her support. The Utah Supreme Court, 
sensitive to the trial court's duty, opined that it is "necessary and proper for the court 
to consider not only his point of view, but all of the factors bearing on the total 
problem." Id. One such factor is to encourage the wife to seek enhanced 
employment, which is not served by cutting off alimony entirely just because she takes 
the initiative and industry to get a job. Id. 
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Appellant also has a greater income potential because of his training, experience 
and seniority acquired over the past 20 years, while Mrs. Springer has been occupied 
mainly in caring for of the home and family. Id. at 905-6. (Tr. 131-2) Moreover, 
Mrs. Springer's needs should be assessed in light of the standaird of living enjoyed by 
her and her children during the marriage. 
The trial court heard all of the evidence regarding the means and sources of 
Mrs. Springer's support. He considered the numerous variables in calculating career 
ladder incentives and was advised that the amount of those incentives had been less 
each year than the year before. The court acted well within its discretion in 
determining that her career ladder income was too speculative and unreliable to give 
certainty on a year-to-year basis. (R. 53, 52; 65, 64) Excluding guesstimates of 
future income amounts was a proper exercise of his discretion. See Rudrnan, 812 
P.2d at 76-7 (A future social security income was too speculative without a specific 
finding as to the amount and date); Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 
1988) (Decreasing wife's alimony based upon speculation as to her future earning 
ability is inappropriate, considering the court's continuing jurisdiction); McCulloch v. 
McCulloch. 435 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Minn. App. 1989) (Future bonus income was too 
speculative and not a dependable source of income.) 
Appellant himself apparently recognized the speculative nature of Mrs. 
Springer's supplemental income when he affirmative alleged and admitted in his 
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Answer that Mrs. Springer's income as a school teacher was $1,700.00 per month. 
(Answer, R. 12) Including the potential of future career ladder bonus would be as 
reasonable as adding to Mr. Springer's income a 3.5% salary step increase for state 
employees anticipated for July 1994, or the state employee raise authorized by the 
1993 legislature. 
And, even more telling, nowhere does Appellant's brief challenge the trial 
court's award of child support or the factual basis for that award. The court 
considered the purposes and function of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992) useful to 
determine income for alimony purposes, as well as for child support purposes. In 
ordering child support at $218.00 per child, the trial judge used the same income and 
expense figures that he used to fix the $300.00 per month alimony. (Add. D, R. 56) 
Appellant has not appealed from that exercise of discretion and concedes that Mrs. 
Springer's income was properly evaluated for support purposes. 
If the trial court's determination of income for child support was not clearly 
erroneous, then that same determination for spousal support is also not clearly 
erroneous. 
B. Appellant fails to show that the award to Mrs. Springer of $300.00 per month 
alimony is inequitable and an abuse of discretion. 
Arguing that the alimony award is unfair to him, Appellant picks and chooses 
among the income and expense figures before the trial court, ignoring more direct 
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comparisons that support the award. He contends that the court should have included 
in Mrs. Springer's income her monthly career ladder incentive and that the omission 
of $68.75 a month requires reversal of the entire $300.00 award - ipso facto. 
(Appellant's Brief at 10) As demonstrated, the court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous when considering the ultimate award and the uncertain speculative nature of 
career ladder. However, whether or not Mrs. Springer's monthly career ladder 
money is considered for support purposes, the $300.00 alimony award is still equitable 
and fair in light of all the factors bearing on the total problem. 
Even assuming Mrs. Springer's gross teacher salary of $1,778.00 was 
augmented to include her monthly career ladder incentive ($68.75), her average 
monthly gross would only be $1,847.00 — almost $1,200.00 less that Appellant's 
monthly gross of $3,045.00. (See, Exh. 5, p. 2) Her monthly income is still only 
60% of his income. Had she been teaching for 20 years she miight now have seniority 
and a greater income potential — but she does not and he does. 
Comparing the parties' net monthly take-home income, his "usable" income is 
$2,016.00 after taxes and insurance (for which he also gets $32.00 credit on child 
support). Mrs. Springer's augmented net monthly take home would be $1,351 — still 
two-thirds that of Appellant's and a difference of $665.00. 
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On virtually all other issues agreed to by the parties, their assets and liabilities 
were divided equally — 50-50. The home equity was divided equally, yielding an 
estimated $35,000.00 each when sold. (Tr. 4, 81)1 Retirement benefits were divided 
equally. (Tr. 5-9) Dental/medical expenses were split equally. (Tr 4). Bank 
overdrafts were roughly equivalent. Each party assumed an automobile payment. 
(Exh. 16; Tr. 16) The trial court properly awarded alimony that would "tend to 
equalize the burden" on Mrs. Springer to maintain a home and a lifestyle "somewhere 
near" that of the marriage. (Findings, R. 62) Appropriately, any necessary decrease 
in that lifestyle should be experienced by both parties. In view of this equal and 
equitable division of assets, the alimony award likewise is not inequitable. Had the 
trial court completely equalized the income and removed Mrs. Springer's disparity, an 
alimony award greater than $300.00 would still have been equitable. 
In Appellant's comparison of the parties' income and expenses, he either 
follows or ignores the trial court's determinations thereof, depending on which figure 
is to his advantage. For example, he chooses the court's lower figure of Mrs. 
Springer's reasonable expenses of $1,800.00 but compares that to the higher income 
figure, including career ladder, which the court rejected. (See Exhs. 17 and 13) 
Although each would receive over $35,000.00 after the Decree, Mrs. Springer would 
have to arrange for a less expensive residence for herself and the children. (Tr. 51) 
Appellant had no need to acquire new accommodations, although he testified that he intended 
to so at an increased expense of $800.00 a month. (Tr. 109; Exh. 5) 
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Exhibit 13 (Add. E) is Mrs. Springer's itemization of income, advising the trial 
court of all the various sources of her "income". Mrs. Springer explained each 
element of that "income" in her testimony, describe its dependability and variation. , 
(Tr. 45-7) The trial court was not bound by Exhibit 13 and the listed income sources 
any more than it was bound by Mrs. Springer's itemized expenses in Exhibit 17. 
Rather, her explanations of income and expenses were factors to consider along with 
Appellant's evidence of his income and expenses in balancing the equitable, reasonable 
needs and abilities of each party. 
Also, in criticizing Mrs. Springer's financial needs, Appellant completely 
neglects to consider the marital liabilities which she must pay in addition to her list of 
monthly expenses (Exh. 16; Tr. 21) — including a $150.00 car payment; R.C. Willey 
bill; $2,000.00 attorney fees; dental bills and a $225.00 bank overdraft. 
Appellant argues that Mrs. Springer's take home is understated because, at 
trial, she took no withholding deductions for her daughters. Appellant claims that 
Mrs. Springer's net income will increase by another $117.00 a month when her 
withholding deductions are increased. (Appellant's brief at 15-6). This argument fails 
for two reasons. Assuming Mrs. Springer's income is augmented by her career ladder 
incentive as Appellant argues, her monthly take home is $1,407.00. Then, if she also 
included three exemptions for withholding purposes, the increase in monthly net is 
only $57.00 — not the $117.00 Appellant claims (compare Add. E and Exh. 29). 
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Secondly, Appellant ignores the fact that Mrs. Springer's alimony income is taxable to 
her. The tax on $300.0 a month alimony decreases the net amount of monthly support 
available to her. And, the tax deduction for alimony that he pays, increases 
Appellant's net income. Her decreased net support and increased tax liability will 
more than offset any benefit gained by increasing her withholding for two dependents. 
Appellant attempts to minimize his own income and expenses, cloaking himself 
in an attitude of benevolent generosity. Appellant claims the trial court erred by 
refusing to accept, whole hog, his estimated future expenses of $2,551.00. 
(Appellant's Brief at 13) Even his present expenses at the time of trial were 
considered by the court to be "overstated". (Finding 24, R. 63) While the court did 
not discuss each and every item, it did discuss some examples. (R. 63) The court 
was entitled to consider the reasonableness of Appellant's claim of $545.00 in rent, 
maintenance and utilities for his mother's home (Tr. 79-81, 157); $98.00 monthly 
entertainment (Tr. 113); operating two automobiles (Tr. 75, 114-5); and, tithing (Tr. 
111). After hearing Mrs. Springer explain her marriage debts (Exh. 16) and 
borrowing $500.00 from her parents, Appellant decided to tell us about the "$500.00" 
that he had "borrowed" from his mother. He was "embarrassed" that he had never 
previously disclosed that "loan" prior to his trial testimony. (Tr. 75) Above and 
beyond Appellant's PEHP benefits as a state employee, he also claimed $57.00 a 
month for his medical and dental bills. (Exh. 5, p. 4) 
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Proper exercise of the court's discretion includes a critical review of all of a 
party's expenses. The issue is not whether Appellant incurred the expenses, but 
whether they are reasonable in light of the whole circumstances, including the needs 
of each party. For example, the purchase of a new home for Appellant alone, at an 
expense of almost $800.00 per month is not reasonable in this case and was further 
indication to the trial court of Appellant's unreasonable, inflated expense. Although 
the trial court did not place a firm total on Appellant's reasonable expenses, if the 
same 30 percent reduction is made to his claimed expenses of $2,312.00 as was made 
to Mrs. Springer's, Appellant's reasonable expenses would only be $1,600.00, leaving 
over $400.00 a month after child support. 
Also, relevant to the court's consideration was the award to Appellant of real 
property near Mountain Spa which Appellant received by inheritance during the 
marriage. As inherited property, the lots were properly awarded to him but the trial 
court could reasonably take that into account when evaluating the entire circumstances 
for purposes of spousal and family support. 
All-in-all, Appellee submits that Appellant's brief is nothing more than an 
attempt to reargue what he believes fair — from his perspective. Appellant ignores 
the perspectives of Mrs. Springer and of the trial court. Whether or not the trial court 
may have confused his explanation of the sources of Mrs. Springer's income, the 
ultimate, resulting award is not seriously inequitable, flawed or unfair. The evidence 
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and record as a whole support the permanent alimony award. Thronson v. Thronson. 
810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 1991); Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah App. 1988). 
There is no abuse of discretion in the $300.00 a month alimony award and the 
award should be affirmed. 
27 
POINT II 
THE AWARD TO MRS. SPRINGER OF ONE-HALF OF HER 
ATTORNEY FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND 
EVIDENCE, AND SHE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Appellant complains that the award to Mrs. Springer of one-half of her attorney 
fees below is not supported by adequate findings. 
At trial, Mrs. Springer's attorney introduced, without objection, his affidavit 
(Exh. 31) that detailed his legal services on her behalf up to the day before trial. 
Exhibit 31 avers that a reasonable fee for his 34.4 hours of sendee is $4,128.00, 
based upon an average rate of $120.00 per hour. (Exh. 31; Tr„ 170-1) All of the 
attorney's work was required in the divorce and the fee was reasonable in light of the 
normal charges for similar services. (Exh. 31) 
The trial court specifically found that (1) "plaintiff has need for such 
assistance," and (2) "defendant has the ability to provide assistance in the payment of 
attorney's fees and costs charged to her by her counsel." The court then ordered that 
"defendant pay one-half of the charges shown on plaintiffs exhibit 31 which the Court 
finds to be reasonable for the services he has performed in this matter." (Memo. 
Dec. R. 50; also, Findings, R. 62) The court then ordered Appellant to pay one-half 
of the $4,128.00 fee. (Decree, R. 72) 
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Mrs. Springer's need for assistance to pay her fees is supported by her monthly 
expenses of $2,580.00 and her marital obligations compared to her monthly take-home 
income. (Exhs. 13, 16, 17; Tr. 26-7, 42) Moreover, her total monthly expenses had 
not significantly reduced since her separation from Appellant, even though Mrs. 
Springer has cut back her expenditures, borrowed from her parents, and relied upon 
her limited savings to make ends meet. As of trial, her expenses without paying her 
accrued attorney fees, still exceeded her income, including the temporary support. 
(Tr. 42) She also described additional, unscheduled maintenance problems in the 
home which would require additional financial resources prior to its sale — a broken 
dishwasher and disposal, painting, a "questionable" roof and $500.00 to repair the 
furnace. (Tr. 43, 60) Her need for assistance is evident. 
Appellant's ability to assist in the payment of Mrs. Springer's fees is evidenced 
by over $36,240.00 in yearly income, at least 30 percent higher than Mrs. Springer's. 
His take-home pay exceeds her highest monthly take-home by over $600.00. In 
addition to his income and divided retirement plan, he was awarded inherited real 
property near the Mountain Spa. (Tr. 4) 
Even assuming that the written findings of the court, prepared by Appellant's 
counsel, are somehow lacking, the award is based upon "evidence of financial need . . 
., the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees". 
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). Viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the finding that Mrs. Springer has need and that Mr. Springer has the 
ability to provide assistance with her attorney fees, the evidence substantially supports 
those findings. 
Not only does the evidence support the award but Appellant failed to object to 
the award of any attorney fees at trial. Nowhere in the transcript does Appellant 
argue or claim that Mrs. Springer was not in need of assistance with her fees, that he 
could not pay, or that the fee requested was not reasonable. (Tr. 170) In fact, at the 
conclusion of the trial, Appellant's attorney agreed that Mrs. Springer's attorney could 
submit his affidavit of attorney fees — received as Exhibit 31. Nothing in that 
affidavit was challenged or refuted. 
While plaintiffs attorney fees was an issue initially left by the parties for trial 
(Tr. 9), there is nQ objection on the record to Mrs. Springer's evidence of her need or 
Appellant's ability to pay. Any oblique concern implied as to the reasonableness of 
the fee arises only from the written statement of Appellant's attorney fees of 
$3,618.00 (not including trial time), which Appellant submitted only because he 
thought the court "should be aware" of Appellant's fees. (Tr. 170; Exh. 36) 
The evidence before the court, including the unrefuted affidavit, sufficiently 
establishes each element of the attorney fee claim. Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1992) When Appellant neither objects to the reasonableness of the amount 
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nor refutes evidence at trial of his ability to pay, any failure to enter detailed factual 
findings is, at worst, harmless. Potter v. Potter. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
In addition to the failure to object at trial, Appellant admits in his brief that 
Mrs. Springer is in need of assistance and that Appellant can pay, and has paid, the 
$2,064.00 attorney fee award. However, in arguing that he should not assist in 
paying Mrs. Springer's fees, Appellant refers to selected facts and contentions outside 
the record. (Appellant's Brief at 20) The specific evidence in the record that supports 
the findings of her need and his ability to pay is ignored in Appellant's brief. 
Appellant's argument here is distinctly different from his cited authority 
Chambers v. Chambers, wherein both parties challenged the trial court's fee award. 
This court remanded Chambers because the trial court failed to "address the 
reasonableness of the fees. . . . " Chambers v. Chambers. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 
(Ct. App. 1992). The circumstances here are not "similar" to that case, because here 
the evidence of fees and reasonableness is uncontested. Judge Ballif s findings 
specifically address the reasonableness of Appellee's fees and find them to be 
reasonable. (R. 62, Finding 26) 
Substantial evidence in this case supports the findings that "plaintiff has need 
for such assistance [in paying attorney's fees], and that defendant has the ability to 
provide assistance in the payment of attorney's fees and costs charged to her by her 
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counsel . . . shown on plaintiffs Exhibit No. 31 which the Court finds to be 
reasonable for the services he performed." (Finding 26, R. 62; Memo. Dec, R. 50) 
In addition to her attorney fees at trial, Mrs. Springer should also be awarded 
her full attorney fees incurred on appeal. Generally, when a party in a divorce action 
is awarded fees by the trial court, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal. 
Potter v. Potter. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39; Lyngle v. Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 
(Utah App. 1992). 
The award of attorney fees should be affirmed and Mrs. Springer should be 
awarded her attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The decree should be affirmed. The award to Mrs. Springer of $300.00 a 
month alimony and $2,064.00 attorney fees is adequately supported by the evidence 
and well within the court's discretion. 
The court's determinations regarding the parties' respective incomes and 
reasonable expenses is not clearly erroneous. The attorney fee award is based upon 
sufficient factual findings and unrefuted evidence. 
Appellee Mrs. Springer should also be awarded her attorney fees incurred in 
this appeal and the case should be remanded for determination of the amount. 
Respectfully submitted this p day of March, 1993. 
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CIWR. Nielsen 
Joseph L. Henriod 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee Karen Springer 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 6913 
Hon. George E. Ballif 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on January 30, 1992. The 
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Joseph L. Henriod. The 
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The 
parties having stipulated as to certain issues; reserving the issues of what, if any, alimony 
and/or attorney's fees should be paid to the plaintiff, and if the Court should consider, in 
calculating plaintiffs income, the money she receives from the school district in a Career 
Ladder Program, and the court having taken certain issues under advisement; having issued its 
Addendum A 
Memorandum Decision on March 12, 1992, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce divorcing her from the defendant, 
said Decree to become absolute and final upon signing and entry of the same in the office of 
the clerk of the court. 
2. There have been six children born as issue of this marriage, three of whom are 
minors, to-wit: Sarah Marie Springer, born June 26, 1975; Hazel Springer, born May 18, 
1978; and Robyn Springer, born January 4, 1980. That the plaintiff and defendant are hereby 
awarded joint custody of the minor children, with the plaintiff being awarded physical 
residential custody and the defendant being awarded reasonable rights of visitation. The Court 
further orders that the parties are to abide by the Stipulation dated July 30, 1991, and the 
Court's Order dated August 26, 1991, with the following exceptions: 
a. The defendant hereby waives any right, title or interest he has in any 
off-sets in the home received by way of inheritance and/or gifts; contributed to or aided in 
construction of the family home and the purchase of the property upon which it is located. 
The parties are ordered to sell the home through Davis Brothers ERA Real Estate Company. 
The plaintiff and defendant have the right in said listing to purchase the home. The home will 
be listed for sale at $140,000.00 or more. The sale price may be reduced by mutual agreement 
of the parties, in the event the home does not sell. 
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b* The Safire wood burning stove shall be left in the premises and made 
part of the sale to any prospective buyers. 
c. In addition to the family home and the property upon which it is 
located in Midway, Utah, there is an additional parcel of real property in Midway, Utah, held 
in the names of the parties. It is hereby ordered that the defendant is awarded all right, title 
and interest in and to said property, and it has been stipulated to that the defendant received the 
same by way of inheritance. The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit claim conveying all 
right, title and interest she has in and to said property to the defendant. Said property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 273.42 feet North of the Southeast 
corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 3 
South, Range 4 East, of the Salt Lake Meridian; and running 
thence North 398 feet; thence West 152 feet; thence South 
398 feet; thence East 152 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Each party is hereby ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the 
use and benefit of the minor children, if available through their employment at a reasonable 
cost. Any expenses not paid for by health insurance which are non-routine health care 
expenses, shall be paid for one-half by the plaintiff and one-half by the defendant. 
4. Each party is ordered to cooperate with the other in implementing the terms 
of the Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
5. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy on her life in the 
amount of $15,000.00 designating the minor children as beneficiaries thereof. 
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6. The defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy on his life in the 
amount of $50,000.00 designating the minor children as beneficiaries thereof. 
7. It is ordered that the parties divide equally all retirement accounts which they 
have acquired, and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order be entered with respect to said 
retirement accounts, it being understood that the plaintiff has a retiirement account and a 40IK 
account through the State of Utah, and that likewise, the defendant has a retirement account 
and a 401K account through the State of Utah. Counsel for the plaintiff is ordered to prepare 
the necessary QDRO's to divide said accounts equally between the plaintiff and defendant, and 
said division shall be effective as of January 30, 1992. 
8. Each party is awarded the personal property as set forth on Exhibit 15 attached 
hereto, which exhibit sets forth property awarded to the plaintiff and the defendant with the 
following exceptions: the Safire wood burning stove set forth on the exhibit to be awarded to 
the defendant shall be left in the family home and made part of the sale price of the home. As 
to the property in dispute, the plaintiff is awarded the oak/maple hutch which matches the 
kitchen set and the wagon axle. The defendant is awarded the Japanese Geisha doll, large 
Navajo rug, pool table (slate bed), and cemetery lots. In order to equalize the division of the 
personal property, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $700.00, which 
sum shall be paid to the plaintiff when the family home is sold. 
9. It is hereby ordered that the parties file a joint tax return for the year 1991, 
and divide any refunds received therefrom equally. The defendant is ordered to pay for the 
4 
cost of preparing the tax returns, and said tax returns shall be prepared by K. Alan Zabel who 
has prepared tax returns for the parties in previous years. 
10. It is hereby ordered that for income tax deduction purposes, the plaintiff will 
be allowed to claim the minor children, Sarah Marie Springer and Robyn Springer, and that 
the defendant will be allowed to claim the minor child Hazel Springer. At such time as the 
minor child Hazel Springer reaches her majority, then the parties shall alternate claiming the 
minor child Robyn Springer for income tax deduction purposes. . -J,* &%!&**£&< 
11. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiflrae sum of $A¥h%& per / f ^ Iff fa 
month per chrtd for the support and maintenance of the minor children until the childTreacfyjpr ' i 
18 years of age or is graduated from the child's high school graduation class. 
12. The defendant is ordered to pay $300.00 per month to the plaintiff as alimony. 
13. The defendant is ordered to pay $2,064.00 for the use and benefit of plaintiffs 
attorney. 
H 
DATED this / ft day of/#fc|H_1992. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGB^E. BALLIF 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 6913 
Hon. George E. Ballif 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on January 30, 1992. The 
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Joseph L. Henriod. The 
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The 
parties having stipulated as to certain issues; reserving the issue of what, if any, alimony and/or 
attorney's fees should be paid to the plaintiff, the court having taken certain issues under 
Addendum B 
advisement; and the court having issued its Memorandum Decision on March 12, 1992, and 
being fully advised in the premises, it now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff is a resident of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and has been for 
three months prior to the commencement of this divorce action. 
2. The parties hereto are husband and wife, having been married on March 15, 
1963, in Cache County, State of Utah. 
3. There have been six children born as issue of this marriage, three of whom are 
minors, to-wit: Sarah Marie Springer, born June 26, 1975; Hazel Springer, born May 18, 
1978; and Robyn Springer, born January 4, 1980. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff 
and defendant shall hfywarded joint custody of the minor children, with the plaintiff being 
awardeq^resldential custody and the defendant being awarded reasonable rights of visitation. 
4. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable differences have developed 
between the parties making it impossible for them to continue their marriage relationship. 
5. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff child 
support based upon the schedules adopted by the State of Utah. 
6. The parties have entered into a Stipulation respecting the family home of the 
parties. It is reasonable and proper that the court abide by said Stipulation dated July 30, 
1991, and the Court's Order dated August 26, 1991, with the following modifications: 
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a. The defendant hereby waives any right, title or interest he has in any 
off-sets in the home received by way of inheritance and/or gifts contributed to or aided in 
construction of the family home and the purchase of the property upon which it is located. The 
parties agree that the home will be sold through Davis Brothers ERA Real Estate Company. 
The plaintiff and defendant shall reserve the right in said listing to purchase the home. The 
home will be listed for sale at $140,000.00 or more. The sale price may be reduced by mutual 
agreement of the parties, in the event the home does not sell. 
b. The parties have agreed that with respect to an offer to purchase the 
home, they will make a counter offer in the amount of $132,500.00. The Safire wood burning 
stove would be left in the premises and made part of the sale to any prospective buyers. 
c. In addition to the family home and the property upon which it is 
located in Midway, Utah, there is an additional parcel of real property in Midway, Utah, held 
in the names of the parties. Said property shall be awarded to the defendant, it being stipulated 
that the defendant received the same by way of inheritance, and the plaintiff shall quit claim all 
right, title and interest she has in and to said property to the defendant. This property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 273.42 feet North of the Southeast 
corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 3 
South, Range 4 East, of the Salt Lake Meridian; and running 
thence North 398 feet; thence West 152 feet; thence South 
398 feet; thence East 152 feet to the point of beginning. 
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7. It is reasonable and proper that each party will provide health and accident 
insurance for the use and benefit of the minor children, if available through their employment 
at a reasonable cost. Any expenses not paid for by health insurance which are non-routine 
health care expenses, shall be paid for one-half by the plaintiff and one-half by the defendant. 
8. Each party represents that they have made a full disclosure of all assets in 
which they have an interest. 
9. Each party will cooperate with the other in implementing the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
10. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff maintain a life insurance policy on 
her life in the amount of $15,000.00 designating the minor children as beneficiaries thereof. 
11. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant maintain a life insurance policy 
on his life in the amount of $50,000.00 designating the minor children as beneficiaries thereof. 
12. It is reasonable and proper that the parties divide equally all retirement 
accounts which they have acquired, and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order be entered 
with respect to said retirement accounts, it being understood that the plaintiff has a retirement 
account and a 401K account through the State of Utah, and that likewise, the defendant has a 
retirement account and a 401K account through the State of Utah. Counsel for the plaintiff 
shall prepare the necessary QDRO's to divide said accounts equally between the plaintiff and 
defendant, and said division shall be effective as of January 30, 1992. 
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13* Each party is awarded the personal property as set forth on Exhibit 15 attached 
hereto, which exhibit sets forth property awarded to the plaintiff and the defendant with the 
following exceptions: the Safire wood burning stove set forth on the exhibit to be awarded to 
the defendant shall be left in the family home and made part of the sale price of the home. As 
to the property in dispute, the plaintiff shall be awarded the oak/maple hutch which matches the 
kitchen set and the wagon axle. The defendant shall be awarded the Japanese Geisha doll, 
large Navajo rug, pool table (slate bed), and cemetery lots. In order to equalize the division 
of the personal property, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of $700.00, which sum 
shall be paid to the plaintiff when the family home is sold. 
14. It is reasonable and proper that the parties file a joint tax return for the year 
1991, and divide any refunds received therefrom equally. The defendant shall pay for the cost 
of preparing the tax returns, and said tax returns shall be prepared by K. Alan Zabel, who 
has prepared tax returns for the parties in previous years. 
15. It is reasonable and proper that for income tax deduction purposes, the plaintiff 
will be allowed to claim the minor children, Sarah Marie Springer and Robyn Springer, and 
that the defendant will be allowed to claim the minor child Hazel Springer. At such time as 
the minor child Hazel Springer reaches her majority, then the parties shall alternate claiming 
the minor child Robyn Springer for income tax deduction purposes. 
16. The Court finds that the plaintiff is employed by Wasatch County School 
District at a salary of $21,335.00 per year which computes to a monthly gross of $1,777.91. 
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In 1991, plaintiff received $405.00 as the team leader for the career ladder program of 
tumbling. This activity is not required as part of her regular salary. The amount she receives 
for this career ladder work varies from time to time. There are expenses involved in this work 
which are reimbursed to her. The work is performed outside of her regular teaching duties. 
17. Title 78-45-7.5 Utah Code Annotated defines gross income as used in the child 
support guidelines and under subparagraph (2) it is provided thatH income from earned income 
sources is limited to the equivalent of one full time job." Subsection 7(d)(iii) provides that 
income may not be imputed if (iii) "a parent engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills 
18. It appears, and the Court concludes from the aibove cited statutes that the 
monies earned by plaintiff in her career ladder work in tumbling should not be included as 
income for purposes of child support. (The Court also notes that the defendant has income 
similar to plaintiffs in that he earns about $400.00 annually as a lecturer at other education 
institutions.) However, the question here also relates to whether this amount of money shall 
also be included in arriving at her income as it may relate to her need for alimony. 
19. The concept and reason for the exception in the child support income area and 
those in a determination of alimony appear to be the same and should similarly be excluded 
in a determining of plaintiff s income as it relates to her need for alimony. To include it would 
bring uncertainty on a year to year basis, as well as penalize her for seeking extra compensa-
tion while pursuing career advancement. The Career Ladder Program could lead to a higher 
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salary which could lead to less alimony in the future. The Court therefore concludes that this 
item should not be included in the determination of her income for purposes of alimony. 
20. Plaintiffs annual income is $21,335.00. This amounts to a gross monthly 
income of $1,777.91. Plaintiff has net take home pay of $1,350.00 after deducting for a credit 
union debt of $186.00, as well as other state and federal tax withholding. She has the primary 
care, custodial responsibility of the parties' three minor children, she will also receive a portion 
of defendant's Utah State Retirement, and his 40IK benefit, the precise amount of these 
benefits has not been determined although it is apparent that plaintiff will receive additional 
income over that which defendant will receive from similar benefits the plaintiff has. 
21. Defendant's expert on job skills and career changes to obtain higher pay can 
be given little weight since plaintiff is happy with her position and is not now desirous of a 
career change. 
22. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 17 sets forth the monthly expenses she will have for 
herself and the three minor children. It is apparent from the exhibit that certain economies 
concerning monthly expenses have not been taken into consideration in the exhibit. The house 
payment listed at $741.59 could be reduced approximately by $200.00 by the acquisition of a 
less expensive new home as is shown by plaintiffs Exhibit No. 18. The automobile expenses 
particularly "replacement" appears to be misplaced as does the $£230.00 contribution items 
which would not be considered as an essential expense per month to the plaintiff. The Court 
notes that other items such as Christmas, birthdays, entertainment and $100.00 per month for 
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clothes are also somewhat overstated. The Court has reduced the house payment to $500.00, 
the food and sundries to#400.00, eliminated the replacement items under auto expense and has 
eliminated the contributions in the sum of $230.00 and has rounded off the last six entries of 
monthly expenses (Exhibit No. 17) to $400.00. This would make the total monthly expense for 
her of $1,760.00. The Court will round off the figure for the plaintiffs support to be 
reasonably at $1,800.00 per month. 
23. Even with the Court's findings as to plaintiffs listed needs and the economies 
and reductions in some areas, the plaintiff has need for assistance in meeting her monthly 
expenses. 
24. As to the defendant's income, according to Exhibit No. 7, he has a present 
salary of approximately $36,240.00 and a net monthly income of $2,016.15. The defendant's 
monthly expenses are listed on his financial declaration as $2,312.00. However, it appeared 
to the Court that there were some overstated items on his total monthly expense detail, one of 
which is a $655.00 item of payment of support re: his prior marriage. This is the amount of 
child support that will be awarded in this proceeding and this should be deleted since the 
plaintiff did not enter the amount of child support she is charged with in this matter which is 
$412.00. Also, the item on the declaration indicating incidentals is principally a donation or 
gift which should be eliminated. Other areas of defendant's monthly expenses are high such 
as entertainment, incidentals and auto payments, which both parties have and therefore further 
reduces defendant's monthly needs. 
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25. Considering the income of each of the parties, their monthly necessary 
expenditures, and the need which the plaintiff has to meet her expenses, the Court has 
concluded that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff as alimony the sum of $300.00 per 
month. This will tend to equalize the burden that the plaintiff has in maintaining the home for 
three children as well as herself and having a lifestyle somewhere near that which she had 
while married to the defendant. 
26. The final item for consideration is plaintiffs claim for assistance in paying 
attorney's fees. The Court finds that the plaintiff has need for such assistance, and that the 
defendant has the ability to provide assistance in the payment of attorney's fees and costs 
charged to her by her counsel and orders that the defendant pay one-half of the charges shown 
on plaintiffs Exhibit No. 31 which the Court finds to be reasonable for the services he has 
performed. 
The court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce divorcing her from the defendant, 
said Decree to become absolute and final upon signing and entry of the same in the office of 
the clerk of the court. 
2. The plaintiff and defendant are entitled to judgment consistent with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
9 
DATED this ? * day of"ktaiV1992. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE ^BALLEF 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FQRM: w&£ , ^
 t 
*7>r 
5EPH L. HENRIOD, ESQ., 
'Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 







Case Number: ^J^^-rrfrffToep^7 
DECISION 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
* * * * * * * * * * 
The above matter came on for hearing on January 30, 1992. 
Plaintiff and her counsel, Joseph Henroid appeared as did the 
defendant and his counsel, Don R. Petersen. The parties stipulated 
to certain issues, and reserved for the Court to decide the 
question of what, if any, alimony should be paid to the plaintiff; 
should the Court consider, in calculating plaintiff's income, the 
money she receives from the school district in a Career Ladder 
Program. Also, what if any attorney's fees should be awarded. 
The Court will also take up the issues reserved in the 
following order; the Career Ladder Program, alimony and attorney's 
fees. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is employed by the 
Wasatch County School District at a salary of $21,3 3 5.00 per year 
which computes to a monthly gross of $1,777.91. In 1991 she 
received $405.00 as the team leader for the career ladder program 
of tumbling. This activity is not required as part of her regular 
salary. The amount she receives for this career ladder work varies 
Addendum C 
2. 
from time to time. There are expenses involved in this work which 
are reimbursed to her. The work is performed outside of her 
regular teaching duties. 
Title 78-45-7.5 Utah Code Annotated defines gross income 
as used in the child support guidelines and under subparagraph (2) 
it is provided that "income from earned income sources is limited 
to the equivalent of one full time job." Subsection 7(d)(iii) 
provides that income may not be imputed if (iii) lfa parent is 
engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job 
skills". . . 
It appears, and the Court concludes from the above cited 
statutes that the monies earned by the plaintiff in her career 
ladder work in tumbling should not be included as income for 
purposes of child support. (The Court also notes that defendant 
has income similar to plaintiff's in that he earns about $4 00 
annually as a lecturer at other educational institutions). 
However, the question here also relates to whether this amount of 
money shall also be included in arriving at her income as it may 
relate to her need for alimony. 
The concept and reason for the exceptions in the child 
support income area and those in a determination of alimony appear 
to be the same and should similarly be excluded in a determining of 
plaintiff's income as it relates to her need for alimony. To 
include it would bring uncertainty on a year to year basis, as well 
as penalize her for seeking extra compensation while pursuing 
career advancement. The Career Ladder Program could lead to a 
3. 
higher salary which could lead to less alimony in the future- The 
Court therefore concludes that this item should not be included in 
the determination of her income for purposes of alimony. 
The next issue to be decided is what, if any, alimony the 
plaintiff should receive. 
Plaintiff's annual income is $21,335.00 This amounts to 
a gross monthly income of $1777.91. Plaintiff has net take home 
pay of $1,350.00 after deducting for a credit union debt of 
$186.00, as well as other state and federal tax withholding. She 
has the primary care, custodial responsibility of the parties' 
three minor children, she will also receive a portion of 
defendant's Utah State Retirement, and his 401(k) benefit, the 
precise amount of these benefits has not been determined although 
it is apparent that plaintiff will receive additional income over 
that which defendant will receive from similar benefits the 
plaintiff has. 
Defendant's expert on job skills and career changes to 
obtain higher pay can be given little weight since plaintiff is 
happy with her position and is not now desirous of a career change. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #17 sets forth the monthly expenses 
she will have for herself and the three minor children. It is 
apparent from the exhibit that certain economies concerning monthly 
expenses have not been taken into consideration in the exhibit. 
The house payment listed at $741.59 could be reduced approximately 
$2 00.00 by the acquisition of a less expensive new home as is shown 
by plaintiff's exhibit #18. The automobile expenses particularly 
4. 
"replacement" appears to be misplaced as does the $230,00 
contributions items which would not be considered as an essential 
expense per month to the plaintiff. The Court notes that other 
items such as Christmas, birthdays, entertainment and $100.00 per 
month for clothes are also somewhat overstated. The Court has 
reduced the house payment to $500.00, the food and sundreys to 
$400.00, eliminated the replacement items under auto expense and 
has eliminated the contributions in the sum of $230.00 and has 
rounded off the last six entries of monthly expenses (exhibit #17) 
to $400.00. This would make the total monthly expense for her of 
$1,760.00. The Court will round off the figure for the plaintiff's 
support to be reasonably at $1,800.00 per month. 
Even with the Court's finding as to plaintiff's listed 
needs and the economies and reductions in some areas, the plaintiff 
has need for assistance in meeting her monthly expenses. 
As to the defendant's income, according to exhibit #7 he 
has a present salary of approximately $36,240.00 and a net monthly 
income of $2,016.15. The defendant's monthly expenses are listed 
on his financial declaration as $2,312.00. However, it appeared to 
the Court that there are some overstated items on his total monthly 
expense detail one of which is a $655.00 item of payment of child 
support re: his prior marriage. This is the cimount of child 
support that will be awarded in this proceeding this should be 
deleted since the plaintiff did not enter the amount of child 
support she is charged with in this matter which is $412.00 also 
the item on the declaration indicating incidentals is principally 
5. 
a donation or gift which should be eliminated. Other areas of 
defendant's monthly expenses are high such as entertainment, 
incidentals and auto payments, which both parties have, and 
therefore further reduces defendant's monthly needs 
Considering the income of each of the parties, their 
monthly necessary expenditures, and the need which the defendant 
has to meet her expenses, the Court has concluded that the 
defendant should pay to the plaintiff as alimony the sum of $3 00.00 
per month. This will tend to equalize the burden that the 
plaintiff has in maintaining the home for three children as well as 
herself and having a lifestyle somewhere near that which she had 
while married to the defendant. 
The final item for consideration is plaintiff's claim for 
assistance in paying attorney's fees. The Court finds that the 
plaintiff has need for such assistance, and that the defendant has 
the ability to provide assistance in the payment of attorney's fees 
and costs charged to her by her counsel and orders that the 
defendant pay one half of the charges shown on plaintiff's exhibit 
#31 which the Court finds to be reasonable for the services he has 
performed in this matter. 
Counsel for the defendant is directed to prepare a final 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree incorporating the 
findings of the Court on the three issues reserved to it together 
with the stipulations contained in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted by Mr. Petersen and approved by Mr. 
Henroid. The Court also finds the plaintiff is entitled to a 
6. 
divorce due to irreconcilable differences between the parties. The 
decree of divorce will be final upon its signing and entry. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this / ^ day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
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) CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
) (SOLE CUSTODY) 
]
 6913 ) Civil N o . 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION 
j Mother ! Father j Combined | 
1. Enter the number of children of this mother and \I1111I11II1\II1I1II111I\ \ 
father for whom support is to be awarded. \IIIII1IIIII\IIIIIIIIII/\ 3 j 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income.|$ |$ !//////////[ 
Refer to Instructions for definition of income. j 1,777.91 ! 3,020.00 j//////////1 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually |- j- !//////////! 
paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). | \ \l/llllllll\ 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter|- j- Mill IIIl//\ 
payments ordered for the child(ren) in this case). J j !//////////! 
2d. For modification and paternity actions only: Enter j j !//////////! 
the amount from Line 12 of the Present Family j- |- !//////////! 
Worksheet for the non-custodial parent. \ \ MlIIIII//1\ 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the j$ |$ J$ j 
Adjusted Monthly Gross for child support purposes. | i 777 QI | -\ 070.00 ! A ,797.91 ! 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of \ 11) 11111111 \l] 11 Tl 11111 \% ' \ 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Ml111111111M1111111111\ 1,088.00 ! 
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. \11111I1111IM1II1111111\ ' j 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3| | Ml/IIIIIIl\ 
by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. | 37 % \ 63 %\lI/I111I/I\ 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain |$ j$ !//////////! 
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. | 402.56 j 685.44 ; //////////1 
7. Enter the child(ren)'s portion of monthly medical and|- j- Mill IIIl/l\ 
dental insurance premiums paid to insurance company, j j 31.79 '//////////! 
|8. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
! Subtract Line 7 from Line 6 for the Obligor parent. Continue tc 




BASE AMOUNT PER CHILD 
Divide Line 8 by Line 1. $217.88 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
Th° BAfiE AMOUNT PER CHILD (Line 9) will be reduced by 50'fe for each child for time periods 
dui'iMM which specific extended visitation of that child with the non-custodial parent is 
'jront-ed in the order for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. 
Addendum D 
ADDENDUM "E" 
INCOMB OF PLAINTIFF 
Wasatch County 
Teacher Step #5 with ES degree *• 30 hours 
$21,335 + 12 » $1,777.92 
Career Ladder Incentive 
$825 + 1 2 = $ 68.75 
Subtotal $1,846.67 
[Additional $700 to $1100 
possible. Was $772.29 in 
1991. Lump sum if qualify.] S 64.36 
Average Monthly $1.911.03 
Withholding 
FICA $.,*«..- -.0 
Federal Withholding 2 32.67 
State Withholding 85.89 
UEA Dues J5.89 
Total Withholding ( 495.75) 
Net excluding annual 
Career Lump Sum of 
$772.29 in 1991 
Addendum £ 
ADDENDUM "F" 
( EXHIBIT >. 
AND THREE MINOR CHILDREN ^•^•MMiMBl 
House Payment (including taxes and insurance) $741.59 ^'^ r< 
Heat 101.00 
Lights 62.00 




Unreimbursed Medical/Dental 40.00 





Replacement 150.00 £ ^  
Contributions 230.00 <t_~c> 
Dues UEA 35.89* 
Christmas/Birthdays 91.0D\ 
Entertainment 75.0tf\ 
Lessons for Children 100.00/ *? ~/N 
School Activities 75.00f ^ " ~ 
School Lunches 83.00] 
Clothing 100. OOJ 
Total Expenses $2,579.89 
*not included in total as it is deducted from income. 
Addendum F 
ADDENDUM "G" 
LIABILITIES INCURRED DURING THE MARRIAGE II 
S&* 
R.C. Willey 
WASCO (for 1988 Chevrolet) 
Henriod, Henriod & Nielsen 
Carlile Knight 
Cemetery Lot Assessment 
Dr. Burton 



















173 Em 2nd North - Hcbcr City, Utah 84032 
(801)654-02*0 WASATCH COUNTY £g 
January 29, 1992 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Mr. Joseph L. Henriod 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Fax - 321-7874 
Dear Mr. Henriod: 
As a follow-up to our telephone conversation, I would like to 
offer the following information with regards to Mrs* Karen 
Springer. In 1990-91, our records show that we paid $772.3 0 in the 
May Career Ladder payment, which covers Performance Bonus and 
Career Ladder. In 1989-90, we paid $798.50. The figures that we 
had mentioned before, with a range of $900.00-$!,100.00, was an 
estimate that came out of a Career Ladder plan. This estimate does 
not include the fact that the Wasatch School District Career Ladder 
Plan reduced its Performance Bonus amount in order to pay for the 
increased cost of the seven days for each teacher; therefore, this 
year the Performance Bonus money available is less than it was last 
year. I would, therefore, inform you that it will be likely, 
depending on the number of teacher candidates who complete their 
Career Ladder plans, that our averages will be lower this year than 
in previous years. We, however, do not know the exact amounts 
until the teachers have completed their Career Ladder agreements 
and the final tabulations have been made. That will occur in May. 
As to the other question concerning whether or not we have 
twelve month teachers - No, the Wasatch School District has no 
twelve-month teaching positions. We do hire approximately five 
regular education teachers for summer school for a five-week 
period. Those applications are put out on a competitive basis and 
there are generally two applications for every teacher hired for 
summer school but that is determined each year by the number of 
candidates available. 
know. If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to let me 
Sinrrferely, 
HEJ/bj 
CC: Don R. 
Dfr: * n r # Eyf Jolley 
Superintendent of Schools 
etersen 
Better Schools Make Better Communities 
Addendum H 
ADDENDUM "I" 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
665 
78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
l6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- a stylistic change in Subsection i7)(c). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection became effective on Apnl 24. 1989, pursuant to 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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